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The Origin of Consciousness. By CHARLES AUGUSTUS STRONG. London, Macmillan & Co., 1918.—pp. viii, 330.

The present volume by Professor Strong is a fulfillment of his promise, made in his earlier work, *Why the Mind Has a Body*, to answer certain difficulties concerning consciousness which formed a hindrance in the minds of many to the acceptance of panpsychism. It is, then, a thorough study of the exact nature of consciousness, controlled by the purpose to show that psychical mind-stuff is the substance of the physical world and that cognition, feeling and will can be explained as functions of the organized psyche.

It is seldom, in these days, that we find an example of such persistent concentration upon a theory. In reading the book I was constantly impressed with the feeling that philosophy was here measurably approaching the method of science. Exact distinctions are drawn, and careful analyses are made; and the whole process of advance is cumulative and empirical. Whether the reader agrees with the various steps or not, he cannot but regard the framework as, itself, a contribution. Specific problems are raised and specific answers given. There is no tendency to dwell in vague generalities, no suggestion of mere impressionism. He is so assured of the truth of his position that he welcomes objections. The book is obviously the product of prolonged and intense reflection upon all the aspects of the mind-body problem.

It has evidently been Professor Strong's experience—as it has been my own—that this problem requires an interpretation of the empirical facts in the light of a definite theory of knowledge. What peculiarly interests me is that his theory of knowledge approximates to my own. It is a form of critical realism. And it has always been my persuasion that the metaphysics of a thinker would be the expression of scientific facts as these are coördinated and illumined by a definite theory of knowledge. Am I forced to accept panpsychism? That has been the question uppermost in my mind while assimilating this suggestive volume.

The book divides into four parts. The first part is introductory; the second concerns itself with the problem of cognition; the third with the unity of mind; and the fourth with mental plurality and diversity. The major portion of the book is devoted to epistemology, and only in the last third is panpsychism defended in detail.

In the preliminary chapter, the author points out the difference between his present position and that held by him in his earlier work. "Thus, in my former book, I had two series or planes of objects, one behind the other, one given to the mind and the other existing outside

it, and my doctrine may be described as having been idealism with representation. I now see that if the outside objects are that to which we adjust our relations—if perception is a function existing primarily for the sake of action, and providing information about external things in order that we may act suitably with regard to them—the external things and they alone are entitled to be called ‘objects,’ the objects of perception; and not the less so because we do not perceive them in all cases exactly as they are.”¹ In short, he now holds that the physical thing is alone the object of both perception and intellection, and that knowledge is *direct*. To use his former terminology, things-in-themselves are knowable. Of course, this means that he has relinquished Kantianism completely.

The reader will probably find some difficulty in getting a clear idea of the terminology Professor Strong employs. Let me therefore give the gist of his notion of the mechanism of cognition and attach his terms to the factors.

We perceive things, but we do not always perceive things as they are. Perceptual error is possible. And it is possible because cognition is not an intuition but an exhibition of things by means of a datum. Naïve realism maintains that the physical thing itself is given, while idealism holds that only mental contents are given. This new form of realism asserts that only essences are given, while the physical thing is known in terms of the essence imputed to it by the percipient’s motor reaction to the stimulus coming from it. The mere givenness of an essence is not knowledge—to suppose so is the mistake of idealism, on the one hand, and of neo-realism, on the other. The object is *affirmed* and known in terms of the imputed datum. Representative realism makes the mistake of supposing that the essence is the first object of cognition and that the physical object is inferred and known later upon the basis of this first act of cognition. We must proclaim that the physical thing is the first and only object of cognition; and that it is affirmed instinctively and is not inferred in some mysterious way.

It may be well to give my own reaction to this teaching. That the physical object is affirmed rather than *intuited* has been one of my contentions. It was for this reason that I designated my position non-apprehensional realism. Knowledge of the physical world is not either a direct intuition or a copy of the physical realm. It is, knowledge in terms of a datum aroused in the mind and referred to the object. *We are aware of the datum and know the object.* And

¹ Page 7.

this brings me to a point upon which I am inclined to criticize Professor Strong. He does not seem to me to distinguish clearly enough between perceptual knowledge and critical knowledge. In fact, so desirous is he of stressing the directness of knowledge that he tends to drop into something closely resembling naïve realism. The essence imputed to the object affirmed is, he asserts again and again, the essence of the object, the essence embodied in the object. I must confess that I am not certain what he means by these expressions. He should have explained them more fully.

It is with some hesitation that I indicate another point of difference between his epistemology and my own. His book is clearly the production of a psychologist trained in introspection. But it appears to me that Professor Strong does not do justice to the recent stress in psychology upon meanings and imageless thought. Let me explain.

Consciousness is used by him in the epistemological sense of givenness, that is, awareness. It is his contention that givenness is not given, that there is no diaphanous consciousness which terminates upon the essence and is given with it. It is clear that he is attacking Moore's teaching. With this attack I, for one, heartily agree. Consciousness is not mingled with the essence given. When I perceive this book before me, the essence, 'a brown oblong book,' is given; but there is not another element, called consciousness, given. From this conclusion, he passes to the assertion that the given-essence or datum in terms of which we perceive the object is a purely logical entity. And it is in this connection that he introduces his vehicular theory. Psychical states are the vehicles of essences. An essence is a universal. It is not in space and time. Particularity comes from the practical attitude of affirmation. "It may be asked how two psychic states so different as a sensation and the corresponding mental image can be the vehicle for givenness of the same essence. For it cannot be doubted that the essences given when I see an object and when I imagine the same object are the same. The answer depends on realizing, first, that the essence is a mere intent, not a sensible fact, and, secondly, that it is brought before the mind not by the psychic state alone but also by the practical attitude. . . What makes essences the same is, after all, our reacting to the objects as the same."¹

Now is not Professor Strong developing in his own way something of what Woodworth means by imageless thought and what Pillsbury means by types? But these gentlemen are psychologists and would

¹ Page 179.

not for a moment proclaim their thoughts and types logical entities. As against the old sensationalism, the vehicular theory seems to me a distinct advance, but I am very skeptical of this carrying of logical entities by psychical states. In fact, I find it difficult to understand the conception of logic. There is something of the same mystery here as in Bradley's notion of meanings as detaching themselves from images. Let me quote Woodworth's Presidential Address: "I call it (my theory), for lack of a better name, the mental reaction theory, or perhaps the perceptual reaction theory. Its basic idea is that a percept is an inner reaction to sensation. I call it a mental reaction to distinguish it from the motor reaction which several psychologists have put forward as being important in attention, perception, association and the like; for it appears to me that these suggestions, while on the right track in insisting that *reaction* is dynamically important, have mistaken the locus of the reaction, and so are unable to account for the conscious content that appears in these mental activities."¹ If something of this sort were adopted, the content of perception could be regarded as psychical and not as a logical entity.

Cognition is, then, a function of the organism, especially of the psyche. It is not an intuition, and can be explained in an evolutionary way. Let me stress my agreement with the writer on this point. I hope his clear analysis will call attention to the possibility of a realism which does justice to the motives which break down naïve realism.

It is obvious that this gnostic realism presses new problems upon the panpsychist. The majority of panpsychists have been phenomenologists and so were able to interpret things-in-themselves by *analogy* with the psychical which remained the sole stuff experienced. But a gnostic physical realist must prove a harmony between the psychical and the physical as known. Otherwise, he cannot make the identification that panpsychism requires. Let us see how our author faces this task.

In the preliminary chapter where he is recording his shift in outlook, he suggests that it may be necessary to "lessen somewhat our conception of the adequacy of introspection and to conclude that, if it does not mis-present, it to some extent fails completely to present, the psychic reality." Thus there is a marked swing toward a one-substance theory. He refuses to accept materialism because a psychic character clearly appears in the object of introspection.

A realistic interpretation of introspection supplements the realistic

¹ *Psychological Review*, Vol. XXII, p. 22.

theory of external perception. Here, again, we meet the vehicular theory. We know introspectively by primary memory, which furnishes the psychical basis for the essence which exhibits the past psychical state. Since the vehicle is *like* the object, the cognition is probably very adequate. "The principle underlying this proof of the adequacy of introspection is that, the more nearly the vehicle is like the object, the more fitted it will be to produce a given-essence rendering the object truly."¹

The feeling or psychic state is independent of our cognition of it, of its being felt. Consciousness is not a part of its nature. Its being does not involve awareness on our part. In this connection, I would suggest that, perhaps, the author does not lay sufficient stress upon the subject side of cognition, upon experiencing. There is somewhat too much stress upon the knowledge-attitude. One gets the impression that the present is experientially the darkest moment.

In cognition, what is discriminated in an essence depends upon our powers of discrimination. "What we perceive introspectively may be only an 'extract' from the total object, a summary view of it, like that which we have of a crowd when we are some distance away."² This point is important, for it is upon it that Professor Strong depends for his faith that psychic states are comparable to the brain. "Do feelings not only consist of parts that are introspectively discoverable, but of parts smaller still that are undiscoverable, and so on indefinitely? Is feeling really as composite as matter?"³ The argument leads to the position that simple qualities, even, are not ultimate. And I think that we enter here upon the weakness of panpsychism. The physical analogy is at work. There must be a one-to-one correspondence between matter as known and feeling.

I have lingered over the main argument of the book, but my selection must not convey the impression that there are not many other features of significance. Thus he takes up the question of the unity of mind under such headings as:—Memory and Personal Identity, The Perception of Change, Mental Synthesis, The Momentary Psychic State. In these chapters the argument is very adroitly directed against any unitary soul. The analyses are radical and in my opinion essentially sound.

A very readable epilogue is appended, entitled Fate and Free Will. Empirical freedom is distinguished from speculative freedom. Only

¹ Page 232.

² Page 232.

³ Page 308.

empirical freedom is essential to morality. We have here a protest against the 'block' universe.

The Origin of Consciousness shows the influence of William James to whom it is dedicated. Yet the originality of Professor Strong is everywhere present. It has helped me to clarify my thoughts on many points and forced me to defend my own prepossessions. It can safely be recommended to the philosophical public as one of the most stimulating books of recent years. It is a warning that both neo-realist and idealist must be prepared to meet a new antagonist in the coming years.

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The Good Man and the Good. An Introduction to Ethics. BY MARY WHITON CALKINS. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918.—pp. xx, 219.

In this introduction to ethics, Miss Calkins proposes to present ethics not "as a science of abstractions—of duty, goodness, virtue, or values—but as the science of the dutiful, the good, the virtuous man and his object. Thus concretely conceived, ethics is an inevitable outlet of psychology and an essential source of sociological science" (p vii.). She analyzes the various descriptive interpretations of the good man, "the good," the virtuous man, the socially virtuous man, to resolve their contradictions in a conception of the good man as one who identifies the good with the community, a community that is inclusive of himself as of all selves,—the universal community. It is in this conclusion that the argument culminates, and at each step it is enforced by insistence on the superficiality of other conflict breeding interpretations.

The conflicts considered are the age old ethical conflicts; they are set forth and criticized with the simplicity appropriate to an introductory treatment. One hopes that even the elementary student, wondering that such stubborn issues yield so readily to treatment, will submit the treatment to the careful scrutiny the author would desire.

The consciousness of obligation is revealed as a paradoxical complex, uniting as it does a sense of compulsion and of freedom in a consciousness of self-compulsion. Since a man as he grows in goodness may have less and less sense of inner compulsion so that the sense of obligation is but transitory, and is, moreover, at no moment, the whole moral experience, moral experience is never merely a consciousness of duty; it is a consciousness of duty with some object. Though